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In October 2006 it was announced that so-called ‘club deals’ between a number of large 
buyout  firms  were  to  be  the  focus  of  a  US  Department  of  Justice  investigation  into 
possible  anti-competitive  behaviour.
1    The  accusation  was  that  by  bidding  as  a 
consortium on particular deals, the private equity firms would refrain from competing 
against ‘club’ partners for other assets in order to minimise the likelihood of competition 
inflating takeover premiums.  In light of these allegations, a New York Times columnist 
asked whether shareholders might feel that “....they are getting too low a premium when 
they see the private equity firms double their money seemingly overnight”.
2
The massive inflow of investor funds and genial market conditions have seen the value of 
private  equity  takeovers  constitute  a  rising  proportion  of  the  overall  mergers  and 
acquisitions market in the US over the past few years.  In fact, it has been estimated that 
this proportion has risen from just below 10 percent in 2003 to in excess of 35 percent for 
the first half of 2007.  Such ‘overheating’ in private finance markets has been shown to 
be associated with rising asset values and premiums.  Examining venture capital funds, 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) found that there is a 
positive  relation  between  the  aggregate  amount  of  investment  capital  raised  and  the 
valuation of venture capital-backed firms – suggesting that a surge in the flow of money 
increases  competition  between  funds,  pushing  up  prices.    Kaplan  and  Stein  (1993) 
provide evidence of similar ‘overheating’ in the leveraged buyout market; the massive 
inflow of new money into LBO funds in the late 1980s was associated with a significant 
increase in the ratio of buyout price to cash flow.  
Oxman  and  Yildirim  (2006)  investigate  the  possibility  of  overheating  in  the  buyout 
market in more recent times.  They examine the premium paid and the risk profile of 
buyout target firms acquired during 1986-2005, and find that premiums paid between 
1998 and 2005 were lower than during the ‘overheated’ period of 1986-1989.  Rather 
than leading to ‘overheating’ in the private equity market, private equity funds appear to 
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have expanded the set of potential targets – the average size of target firms has increased, 
and there is some evidence that private equity firms are acquiring targets with higher 
operating  risk.    In  the  only  study  that  we  know  of  examining  whether  ‘networking’ 
between players in a particular market can affect prices, Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu 
(2007) present evidence that networking between venture capital providers can adversely 
affect firms seeking  venture  capital  funding.   They find that the  greater the network 
density, the poorer are the terms on which supported firms are able to raise capital.
Bargeron et al (2007) find that the premiums paid by private firms during 1990-2005 are 
significantly smaller than those paid by public firms.  However, rather than private equity 
premiums being too low, they argue that premiums paid by publicly listed companies are 
in fact too high.  Bargeron et al (2007) show that the difference in premiums is explained 
by publicly listed acquirers’ differential levels of managerial share ownership.  Those 
with low levels of managerial ownership pay greater premiums than acquirers with high 
managerial  ownership;  managers  of  firms  with  diffuse  ownership  thus  do  not  have
sufficient incentive to refrain from overpaying.
In this paper, we look specifically at private equity takeovers during the period of interest 
to the Justice Department.  Our sample comprises 114 consummated takeovers of US 
listed firms, of which 55 are private equity buyouts and 59 are acquisitions by listed 
companies, announced between July 2004 and June 2007.  We address the question, do 
shareholders of firms that are ‘taken private’ by private equity specialists receive lower 
premiums than firms that are taken over by other acquirers?  While controlling for several 
well-known determinants of premium, we find weak evidence that premiums paid by 
private  equity  specialists  are  significantly  lower  than  those  paid  by  other  industrial 
companies.  This cannot be explained by managerial shareholding in public acquirers, 
because in contrast to Bargeron et al (2007), we find a positive relation between officers’ 
and managers’ stockholdings and premium.
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  structured  as  follows.    In  section  2  we  provide  a 
background  to  value  creation  in  takeovers,  including  private  equity  acquisitions.    In 4
section 3 we discuss the data set, and present descriptive statistics and the results of 
univariate tests of premium and control variable difference.  In section 4 we present the 
findings of our multivariate analysis, and section 6 summarises and concludes.
2. Background – takeovers and public-to-private transactions
There is a large body of evidence on value creation in takeovers demonstrating that target 
shareholders  earn  substantial  excess  returns  around  takeover  announcements,  but  the 
evidence for bidding firms is equivocal,
3 and debate continues as to whether takeovers 
really create economic value.  Seminal research by Marris (1963) and Manne (1965) 
suggested that the function of the takeover market was to correct the failure of product 
and input markets by disciplining management teams that fail to act in the interest of 
stockholders.    Since  this  early  work,  which  has  been  extensively  empirically  tested 
(Mandelker, 1974; Ellert, 1976; Smiley, 1976; Dodd and Ruback, 1977; Langetieg, 1978; 
Asquith, 1983; Martin and McConnell, 1991; Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1989; Mikkelson 
and Partch, 1997), theoretical and empirical research on takeovers has been extended to a 
plethora of subsequent papers that have investigated a wider set of possible sources of 
takeover gains.  Perhaps the most theoretically appealing is that takeovers result in a 
synergy between the bidder and target, creating an entity of greater value than the sum of 
its constituent parts (Asquith, 1983: Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1983; Fabozzi et al, 1988; 
Pound, 1988; Brous and Kini, 1993).  A theory that has attracted comparatively little 
attention is the creation of market power (Stillman, 1983; Eckbo, 1983; Huck, Konrad 
and Müller, 2001).
Private transactions typically differ in a number of significant ways from other corporate 
control transactions.  With few exceptions, these transactions are financed by borrowing 
substantially  beyond  the  industry  average  (Renneboog  and  Simons,  2005).    For  this 
reason, the literature has focused on a specific form of public-to-private transaction: the 
leveraged buyout (LBO).  The main feature of LBOs that sets them apart from other 
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takeovers is the source of equity used; Jensen (1986) dubbed these equity providers ‘LBO 
associations’, but they are now more commonly known as private equity groups.  
The fact that private equity groups willingly pay a premium to take target companies 
private and yet still expect to generate a positive return on investors’ funds suggests, 
prima facie, that such transactions create value.  However, as with takeovers generally, 
there is continuing debate on whether private equity groups actually do create value.  The
problem is that, in contrast to takeovers by public  firms of public firms – for which 
objective (if imperfect) market-based evidence on value creation is available – the quality 
of the data on private equity performance is poor.  Despite popular perception and hype 
from  the  industry,  recent  academic  evidence  shows that  private  equity  returns  are 
decidedly  underwhelming.    For  example,  Phalippou  and  Gottschalg (2007),  after 
correcting  for  various  biases  in  the  data,  find that  the  average  private  equity  fund 
underperforms the S&P 500 by about 3 percent per year.
Nonetheless,  several  studies  have investigated  a  number  hypotheses  explaining  how 
‘going private’ transactions potentially create value.  Chief among them are tax savings, 
the  reduction  of  agency  costs,  wealth  transfers  from  bondholders  or  employees  to 
shareholders, the  reduction  of transactions  costs, and  corporate undervaluation.    Two 
alternative viewpoints have been advanced on the tax benefits of LBOs.  Lowenstein 
(1985)  and  Frankfurter  and  Gunay  (1993)  argue  that  private  equity  groups  exploit  a 
favourable tax regime without having to contribute any ‘real’ value; and while Kaplan 
(1989)  and  Marais,  Schipper  and  Smith  (1988)  also  attribute  a  sizeable  portion  of 
premiums paid to tax benefits, they do not agree that this alone justifies a firm leaving the 
public  markets.    Opler  and  Titman  (1993)  find  that  firms  assume  more  debt  than  is 
necessary to eliminate their tax expense, suggesting that there is an additional role played 
by debt.  Lehn and Poulsen (1989) failed to find a significant relation between the size of 
the premium paid to take a firm private and the ex-ante potential for tax savings, but 
more recently Kieschnick (1998) finds a positive relation between premium size and tax 
benefits when outliers are omitted from the sample.   6
Other authors maintain that the reduction of agency costs is the primary source of value 
creation stemming from public-to-private transactions, and this can occur via two routes.  
The  first  relates  to  the  better  alignment  between  the  incentives  of  management  and 
shareholders’ interests.  Halpern et al (1999) provide evidence that firms with low levels 
of pre-buyout managerial equity ownership are more likely to undergo a buyout, and 
Kaplan (1989) finds that equity ownership amongst firms’ top officers increases post-
buyout.  Kieschnick (1998), however, highlights the inability of the incentive realignment 
theory to explain the high frequency with which secondary IPOs are employed as an exit 
strategy.
A second route to value creation via the reduction in agency costs involves the quality of 
control.  De Angelo, De Angelo and Rice (1984) speculate that buyout specialists may 
have a comparative advantage in monitoring a firm’s activities, and create value as a 
result of an increased quality of control.  Maug (1998) finds that investors will have an 
increased incentive to monitor management activities when equity ownership is more 
concentrated, and Gillian and Starks (2007) describe the buyout specialists of the 1980s 
as  the  ultimate  shareholder  activists,  in  terms  of  the  vigour  with  which  they  would 
subsequently monitor the firm’s activities.
A well-documented source of gains from ‘going-private’ transactions is encapsulated by 
the free cash flow hypothesis.  Free cash flow is commonly accepted to be the cash flow 
remaining after financing all positive NPV projects have been financed (Jensen, 1986). 
Managers have incentives to use free cash flow to expand their firms beyond the size that 
maximises shareholder wealth (Hope and Thomas, 2007).  Lowenstein’s (1985) carrot-
and-stick theory describes how LBOs counteract this problem. The carrot represents the 
increased managerial share ownership, which ties managerial incentives to shareholder 
value.  The  stick  signifies  the  high  leverage  associated  with  such  deals,  which 
subsequently consumes much of the firm’s free cash flow through an increased interest 
burden.  Opler and Titman (1993) provide evidence in support of the free cash flow 
hypothesis. They find that firms that go private via an LBO typically have high levels of 
cash flow and low growth opportunities, suggesting that debt plays a role in eliminating 7
the  incentive  of  management  to  invest  excess  cash  flow  in  negative-NPV  projects.  
However, some more recent evidence fails to  provide support  for the free cash  flow 
hypothesis.  Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg (1999) find a positive but insignificant 
relation between free cash flow and the propensity to go private, and Renneboog, Simons 
and Wright (2005) and Weir, Laing and Wright (2004) reach a similar conclusion for 
studies focusing on the UK public-to-private market. Holmstrom and Kaplan’s (2001) 
claim that shareholder value has been institutionalised post-1980s provides a possible 
explanation for the lack of support in the more recent literature.
The  wealth  transfer  hypothesis  states  that  gains  arising  from  public-to-private 
transactions  are,  at  least  in  part,  a  transfer  of  wealth  from  other  stakeholders  to 
stockholders.  Asquith  and  Wizman  (1990)  find  that  corporate  bondholders  with 
insufficient covenant protection experience losses from a buyout, and Warga and Welch 
(1993) find significant bondholder wealth losses for successful LBOs in the 1980s.  The 
transfer of wealth from employees to stockholders has also attracted some attention in the 
empirical literature, with some researchers attempting to investigate the widely-held view 
that  LBOs  result  in  redundancies  and  wage  cuts.    Kaplan  (1989)  and  Smith  (1990) 
reported a loss of employment in post-LBO firms after adjusting for industry effects.  
The undervaluation hypothesis as a source of wealth gains for going private transactions
has also attracted academic attention.  Studies have mainly examined MBOs on the basis 
that incumbent management may benefit from information asymmetry with regard to the 
true  value  of  their  firm.    Goh  et  al (2002)  test  the  undervaluation  hypothesis  by 
examining analysts’ earnings forecast revisions around the time of the announcement. 
They  find  a  significantly  positive  relation  between  forecast  revisions  and  abnormal 
returns associated with the announcement of the LBO.  As these upward revisions do not 
appear to be to the detriment of competing firm’s prospects, the authors posit that the 
forecasts must have been understated.  Lowenstein (1985) and Schadler and Karns (1990) 
speculate that management may even employ specific accounting and finance techniques 
to deliberately depress the firm’s share price prior to an MBO.  However, Smith (1990) 8
finds that cash flows fail to exceed forecasts following failed buyout attempts, thereby 
suggesting some other element of the LBO model acts to improve operating performance. 
3. Data and descriptive statistics
Our data set comprises consummated takeovers announced during the  period 1
st July 
2004 to 7
th June 2007.  The takeover-related information is drawn from the Thomson 
SDC database, and it comprises acquirer and target names, industry, business description 
and public status, deal value, price paid per share, date of announcement and completion, 
target  management’s  attitude  to  the  bid,  and  type  of  acquisition.    Accounting  and 
financial data were obtained  from Datastream.  (All financial statement  variables are 
drawn from the most  recent financial statement  prior to  announcement).  The SEC’s
Edgar database  provided  a  supplementary  source  of  account information  where 
necessary.  All sample acquisitions had to fit into one of two groups:
1. Public firms acquired by another listed industrial company. 
2. Public firms acquired by a private equity group or consortia of private equity 
groups.
After removing financial sector firms, we randomly sampled from the remaining 654 
deals 102 public acquirer and 98 private equity takeovers.   We removed any firms for 
which  accounting  and  price  data  were  not  available  on  Datastream,  those  with  a 
transaction value of less than $10 million, and those for which the acquirer did not obtain 
100  percent  of  outstanding  shares.    Further,  following  Opler  and  Titman  (1993),  we 
excluded  target  firms  with  a  negative  value  for  EBITDA  for  the  year  preceding  the 
takeover announcement.  Likewise, target firms exhibiting a total shareholders’ deficit for 
the year prior to takeover are excluded from the sample.  An additional requirement for 
the private equity takeovers was that management did not constitute part of the buyout 
team.  This last requirement ensures that all transactions relate specifically to the actions 
of private equity groups.  The final sample comprises 114 acquired firms: 59 private 
equity takeovers and 55 by public companies.9
Calculating premium
A popular approach in the academic literature is to use the target’s cumulative abnormal 
return, from some time prior to announcement to the announcement date, as a proxy for 
premium.  We use this approach, and also the simpler approach of taking the difference 
between the pre-bid stock price and the offer price (for stock-swap bids, the equivalent 
cash price, drawn from SDC, is calculated based on the closing price of the acquiring 
firm the day before announcement), and expressing this difference as a percentage of the 
pre-bid price.  We call this the ‘simple premium’.  The pre-bid price (or start date for the 
abnormal return calculation) is sometimes taken from well before the announcement date, 
in order to avoid contaminating the calculation with the pre-bid price ‘runup’.  To be 
consistent with Bargeron et al (2007), we use the 1-day prior AR (AR1) and pre-bid price
(PREM1),  and  we  also  calculate  10-day  prior  AR  (AR10)  and  simple  premium
(PREM10).  We use the market model to calculate abnormal returns, with the S&P 500 as 
the market benchmark.   
Control variables
We  use  several  deal-related  and  target-specific  control  variables.    The  type  of  bid 
financing – cash or stock – has also been found to be associated with premium size.  Prior 
research on the so-called medium of payment decision finds that cash bids are associated 
with higher premiums than stock-swap bids (Wansley, Lane and Yang, 1983; Huang and
Walkling, 1987; and Hayn, 1989).  This is perhaps because target shareholders require a 
higher premium for cash bids to compensate for capital gains tax, and a second potential 
explanation is that bidders are prepared to pay more when paying in cash due to the tax 
deductibility of interest payments on additional debt.  The dummy variable STOCK takes 
the value of 1 for non-cash bids and 0 for cash bids.  Several studies (see Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983) have found that tender offers are associated with higher premiums than 
mergers.    We  include  the  dummy  TO which  is  equal  to  one  if  the  acquisition  was 
conducted via a tender offer.  The bidder’s prior ownership of the target firm (‘bidder’s
toehold’) has been found to be inversely related to premium size (Walkling and Edmister, 
1985; Walkling and Long, 1986; Kaufman, 1988).  A value for one in dummy variable 
THLD denotes that the acquiring firm had a toehold in the target.  The final deal-related 10
variable is DIVERS, which takes the value of one if the acquired firm is in a different 
industry (2-digit SIC) from the acquirer.
Several target characteristics have been found to affect the size of the takeover premium.  
Early  studies  found  that  targets  with  low  leverage  command  significantly  higher 
premiums (Walkling and Edmister, 1985), but Bargeron et al (2007) found that leverage 
is not a significant determinant of premium in their multivariate analysis.  We measure 
leverage, DA, as the book debt-to-assets ratio.  The size of the target firm has also been 
found to be positively associated with premium (Asquith, Bruner and Mullins, 1983; 
Hayn, 1989), although many studies have found this relation to be weak.  Post-Sarbanes-
Oxley  Act,  however,  there  is  a  stronger regulatory  cost  argument  for  small  firms 
attracting higher premiums – there are substantial potential savings involved in taking 
small firms out of public ownership vis-à-vis large.  This benefit would accrue to public 
company acquirers  as  well as  private,  assuming  the  target  is  fully  acquired  and 
subsequently de-listed.  Our proxy for firm size is deal value (DV), which is the market 
capitalisation of the target firm on announcement day.
An inverse relation has been found between premium size and a target’s Tobin’s q ratio –
the market value of a firm’s assets to the replacement value of those assets (Lang, Stulz 
and Walkling, 1989; Datta, Iskander-Datta and Raman, 2003).  Tobin’s q is generally 
accepted  as  the  best  way  to  capture a  firm’s  growth  prospects.    However,  the 
impracticality  of  calculating  the  replacement  value  of  a  firm’s  assets  has  led  other 
researchers to search for an alternative.  Amit, Livnat and Zarowin (1989) find that the 
ratio of a firm’s market value to its book value is a good proxy for Tobin’s q.  We 
calculate this ratio (MTB) as the target firm’s market capitalisation on the day of the 
takeover announcement to its book value of assets. 
Lastly, there is some evidence that premiums are higher in the presence of substantial 
free cash flow (Lehn and Poulsen, 1993).  We use EBITDA/market capitalisation as a 
proxy for free cash flow (EBM).  Two measures of cash flow have been used in prior 
literature; one being earnings before interest, tax and depreciation (EBITDA), the other 11
net cash flow (Kaplan and Stein, 1993).  For the purposes of this study, EBITDA holds 
one key advantage over net cash flow.  By definition, EBITDA is a measure of gross cash 
generated  from  operations.    Given  the  tax-deductibility  of  interest,  EBITDA  will 
therefore provide a private equity acquirer with an indication of how much additional 
interest the target firm can afford subsequent to being taken private.  Given that cash flow 
in itself may proxy for size, we scale EBITDA by the target firm’s market capitalisation.
We use two additional variables, suggested by Bargeron et al (2007) that relate to the pre-
bid performance of the acquired companies – ARET and RUNUP.  RUNUP is the market-
adjusted target return for day –63 to day –6 relative to announcement day (day 0), and 
ARET is the same for day –250 to day –63.  
There are two control variables that are standard in the takeover premium literature that 
we  do  not  need  to  use.    The  first relates  to  competition  between  bidders.    There  is 
considerable evidence that premiums are higher when more than one bidder is actively 
seeking  to  take  over  the  target  (Walkling  and  Edmister;  1985,  Morck,  Shleifer  and 
Vishny, 1990; Suk and Sung, 1997).  Without taking steps to deliberately exclude them, 
we have no cases of competing bids in our sample.  The extensive evidence on the effect 
of competition  for  takeover  targets  on  premiums  is  perhaps  now well  understood by 
stockholders;  the  fact  that  competition  in  takeovers  is  now  rare  is  consistent  with 
improved corporate governance (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001) and the recognition that 
many acquiring firms have in the past experienced the ‘winners curse’ by paying too 
much  for  acquisitions.    From  the  perspective  of  private  equity  groups,  reducing  the 
likelihood of competition for a particular target would be important to avoid overpaying, 
and  this  is  clearly  the  concern  of  antitrust  regulators  – that  such  groups  may  be
effectively colluding to prevent competition.
The second relates to hostile takeover bids.  The issue of the relation between target 
management opposition and premium size has been a popular one in the literature, but the 
findings vary; Jarrell (1985) and Jennings and Mazzeo (1993) found a positive relation, 
but  Huang  and  Walkling  (1987)  and  Servaes  (1991)  found  no  significant  relation.  12
Similarly to competing bids, hostile bids are now rather rare, and again without design 
our sample has no hostile bids.  Certainly the modern form of private equity takeovers are 
characterised by a lack of hostility.
Summary statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the non-dummy control variables: ARET and 
RUNUP, deal value (in millions of dollars) (DV), EBITDA/market capitalization (EBM), 
market-to-book (MTB), and the debt-to-assets ratio (DA).  Panel A presents summary 
statistics for the sample overall.  The mean deal value is $2,235 million, or just over $2 
billion, and the median of $1,115 million is considerably lower.  Precisely half of the 
target firms in the sample have a market capitalisation of less than $1 billion, and are 
therefore classified by the American Association of Individual Investors as small firms
4.
In  Panel  B,  summary  statistics  are  reported  for  public  acquirer  and  private  equity 
takeovers separately.  The public company takeovers are slightly larger than the private 
equity takeovers, but this difference is not significant (p = 0.44 using a Wilcoxon rank 
sum test).
5  This is interesting because Bargeron et al (2007) find that targets of private 
bidders are about half the size of targets of public companies.  Modern private equity 
targets are larger on average than in previous takeover booms, and this is consistent with 
Oxman  and  Yildirim  (2007)  who  found  that  the  size  of  private  equity  targets  has 
increased over the last 20 years or so.  Targets of public company takeovers have slightly 
lower EBITDA/market capitalisation and lower levels of debt relative to assets, but have 
higher  market-to-book  ratios.    None  of  these  differences,  however,  are  significant  at 
standard levels.   Consistent  with  Bargeron  et al (2007) private  equity  targets have  a 
higher average (and median) debt-to-assets ratio, but this difference is not significant.  On 
the basis of these financial ratios, it appears to be the case that public firms and private 
equity acquirers target the same types of firms, with the possible exception of cash flow 
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5 As there is some skewness in most of our variables, we conduct our univariate testing with the non-
parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test.  However, for most of our variables skewness is not excessive.  The
exceptions are deal value, market-to-book, and EBITDA/market capitalisation, which are highly positively 
skewed.  For this reason we use the log of these variables for our multivariate analysis.13
characteristics – the private equity buyers acquire firms with higher free cash flow.  The 
difference however is barely significant, with p = 0.10 for the Wilcoxon rank sum test.
Also in Table 1 are summary statistics for the pre-bid performance of the target firms.  
Overall (Panel A) the target firms earn an abnormal return of 5 percent in the runup, and 
they are slight underperformers relative to the market (-1.84 percent) in the 9 months or 
so before  the  runup  period.    When  divided  into  private  equity  and  public  company 
acquisitions (Panel B), it is clear that the pre-bid behaviour between the two is quite 
different.  Recall that the ARET period begins 250 days prior to announcement and ends 
at day -63.       The targets of public acquirers are on average underperformers (with an 
average CAR of -8.26 percent and a median of -9.25 percent) whereas the private equity 
group’s  ARET  average  is  5.05  percent  (median  -0.02  percent).    This  difference  is 
significant  at  standard  levels using  a  standard  t-test  and  a  Wilcoxon  test.    This 
unanticipated finding is at variance with that of Bargeron et al (2007), who find that 
targets of both private equity firms and public companies underperform in the year prior 
to  announcement.    In  contrast, the  RUNUP abnormal  returns  are  not  significantly
different.  
The patterns of pre-bid price behaviour can be seen clearly in Figures 1 to 3, which depict 
the  cumulative  average  abnormal  return  (CAAR)  for  the  250  days  up  to  the 
announcement of the takeover for the full sample, the public acquirer targets and the 
private equity targets respectively.  Consistent with prior evidence on pre-bid abnormal 
returns,  generally  the  targets’  performance  follows that  of  the  market  until  about  3 
months before the takeover, when a relatively small runup begins (Figure 1).  However, 
the  private  equity  and  public  acquirer  subsamples exhibit  quite  different  pre-bid 
behaviour.    The  CAAR  for  targets  of  public  company  takeovers  (Figure  2)  shows
underperformance for most of the 250-day pre-bid period, with a runup that is similar to 
that for the sample overall.  In contrast, private equity takeovers appear to involve target 
firms that outperform the market on average for most of the pre-bid period (Figure 3).  
This may be because the market is able to anticipate these firms’ acquisitions well in 
advance of the bid.  Many commentators attributed the stock market boom of 2003-2007 14
at least partly to a ‘likelihood of being taken private premium’, and several websites 
provide advice on how to pick stocks that will be subject to private equity bids.
6  
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the four measures of premium, and as in Table 1, 
Panel A presents the statistics for the sample overall and Panel B the private equity and 
public company acquisitions separately.  For the full sample, mean values for abnormal 
return – at 16.83 and 17.33 percent for the 1-day and 10-day AR – are broadly consistent 
with previous evidence from the US takeover market, although they are at the lower end 
of the range presented by Jensen and Ruback (1983) in their summary of 13 early studies 
of premium.  The means  for premium at 24.45  and 25.40 for  PREM1 and PREM10
respectively are considerably higher than for the AR returns, and this is because abnormal 
returns calculated up to the announcement day (or even a day or two after) understate the 
actual  premium  paid  to  target  stockholders.    The  extent  of  stock  price  reaction  on 
announcement day depends not only on the size of the premium but also on the market’s 
perception of the likelihood of success of the bid.  On average, the announcement day 
stock price will increase to a price that is usually somewhere below the bid price, from 
where (for bids that are ultimately successful) the target stock price tends to drift upward 
during the offer period (Samuelson and Rosenthal, 1986; Hutson, 2000).  In our sample, 
the  (unadjusted)  stock  price  jumps  to  just  over 80  percent of  the  level  of  the  actual 
premium on announcement day.
The mean and median premiums for both private equity and public acquirer (Panel B of 
Table 2) are considerably lower than those of Bargeron et al (2007).  We find that the 1-
day  prior  AR  premium  paid  for  targets  by  private  equity  acquirers  is  15.45  percent,
compared to their 22.2 percent; for public acquirers our equivalent premium is 18.13 
versus theirs of 31.74 percent.  Their calculation  ‘FFRET’ – the CAR from one day 
before announcement to the conclusion of the bid – is similar to our PREM1, except that 
PREM1  is not  market adjusted.   Despite not  being market-adjusted  (in  a strong bull 
market), our simple premiums are still much lower than their FFRET (our 20.98 percent 
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versus  their  24.21  percent  for  private  equity  and  27.69  versus  their  33.24  for  public 
acquirers).  Because Bargeron et al’s (2007) sample runs from 1990 whereas ours starts 
in 2004, this is consistent with the reduction in takeover premiums over time as reported 
by Oxman and Yildirim (2006).
Another important difference between our findings and that of Bargeron et al (2007) is 
that we do not find particularly strong evidence that public acquirer premiums are higher 
than private equity premiums.   On a univariate basis, the premiums as measured by AR 
are not significantly different.  In contrast, the difference is significant as measured by 
simple premium.  Compare, for example, the difference between AR1 and PREM1.  The 
public bidder PREM1, at 27.69 percent, is 9.5 percentage points (53 percent) higher than 
the CAR premium, and for the private equity sample the PREM1 of 20.98 percent is only 
5.5 percentage points higher than the AR1 (35 percent).  The difference is even greater 
(56 for public company versus 35 percent) and using the PREM10 and AR10.  Using the 
AR as a proxy for premium appears to inflate the private equity premium relative to the 
public company premium.  This can be explained by the fact that, as discussed above, the 
announcement day abnormal return does not reflect the full premium – because it also 
reflects the market’s assessment of the likelihood of success of the takeover bid.  For 
private equity takeover bids, the target stock price moves 87 percent of the way to the bid 
price that day, whereas the stock price of targets of public company bid increases only by 
74 percent on average.  Applying the simple model of Samuelson and Rosenthal (1986), 
this implies that private equity takeover bids are generally assessed to have a greater 
likelihood of success than bids by public companies.
One potential explanation for the inconsistency of our findings and that of Bargeron et al 
(2007) is that our public company sample contains non-cash bids.  Table 3 reports on the 
public acquirer targets divided into cash and non-cash.  ‘Non-cash’ includes targets of 
stock-swap as well as mixed bids – those in which the target shareholder has a choice of 
cash or shares, or the consideration includes both cash and stock.  The premiums are 
higher for cash bids than non-cash, but this is significant only for the AR proxies for 
premium.  Again, this is because of differing likelihoods of success as reflected in the 16
extent to which the announcement day stock price increases toward the bid price.  For the 
cash bids, the announcement day price jump is 90 percent of the bid premium, whereas 
for non-cash bids the price increases to only 67 percent of the premium.  Nonetheless, as 
private equity firms pay cash, this may be a reason why popular opinion has it that public 
company acquirers pay higher premiums than private equity groups – cash premiums are 
more visible and may attract greater media attention than non-cash premiums.
An interesting finding is that the debt-to-assets ratio is significantly lower for cash bids 
versus non-cash, with a median of 0.07 for cash versus 0.23 for cash.  The difference in 
premium between cash and non-cash public takeovers may therefore be the result of the 
very different capacity to take on new debt; cash bidders are perhaps prepared to pay a 
higher premium when there are additional tax benefits as a result of adding debt to the 
target’s capital structure.  Comparing the debt-to-assets ratios of public firms that acquire 
by paying cash (top of Table 3) with private equity buyers, all of whom paid cash (Panel 
B in Table 1), debt is much lower for the former (0.11) than the latter (0.24).  Perhaps the 
public acquirer’s decision about how to pay for acquisitions depends to some extent on 
the leverage of the target; those with relatively low leverage are paid for in cash and those 
with  higher  leverage,  stock.    This  is  consistent  with  prudence  on  the  part  of  public 
acquirers, and this, together with relatively small premiums, is consistent with enhanced 
corporate governance (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001).
Table 4 presents a brief summary of industry.  Private equity takeovers dominate public 
company  takeovers  in  consumer  and  retail,  whereas  public  firms  are  more  likely  to 
acquire energy and health care targets.  High technology, materials and media targets are 
equally popular with public  acquirers and private equity specialists.  For the dummy 
variable  controls (not  reported  in  tables),  16  takeovers  are  tender  offers,  9  are
diversifying takeovers, and for only 5 the acquirer had a toehold.  All of these refer to 
public acquirers – none of the private equity takeovers were tender offers, nor did any of 
the private equity firms acquire a pre-bid toehold.17
The Pearson correlation matrix for the variables is presented in Table 5.  From the four 
columns  on  the  right-hand-side  of  the  table – reporting  correlations between  the 
premiums and the control variables – it is clear that there is a strong inverse relation 
between premium and our proxy for target firm size (DV).  It is also clear that targets that 
have performed poorly relative to the market before the takeover bid (as measured by 
ARET) tend to attract higher bid premiums.  As the correlations on the left-hand-side of 
the table – those between the control variables – are small and mostly insignificant, we do 
not anticipate any multicollinearity problems in the multivariate analysis. 
4. Multivariate analysis
We run a series of robust regressions with the four alternative measures of premium as 
the dependent variable and the full set of controls as explanatory variables.  An indicator 
variable, PEDUM, takes the value of 1 if the acquirer is a private equity firm.  Table 6
presents the findings of our multivariate analysis.  The table is divided into two sections, 
with the results for abnormal returns as the proxy for premium on the left hand side, and 
the findings using the simple  premium on the right.  For the 10-day prior measures, 
RUNUP is omitted because the runup period overlaps with the premium estimate in these 
cases.  The explanatory power of the models, as indicated by the adjusted R-squared, is 
much greater for the 1-day prior premiums than the 10-day prior premiums.  This is 
probably because there is less noise in the closer estimates.  Further, there is little need to 
start the premium estimate well before the announcement because there is no dramatic 
runup  in  the  days  immediately  before  the  announcement  as  has  been  found  in  prior 
studies (see, for example, Schwert, 1996).
The coefficient on the PEDUM indicator variable dummy is negative and significant at 
the 10 percent level or better in all four models, but is significant at standard levels (p = 
0.03) only in one – the AR1 model.  These findings are generally supportive of private 
equity premiums being lower than public acquirer premiums, even after controlling for 
many deal and target-specific variables.  18
Of the deal-specific control variables, only STOCK is significant, implying that stock 
bids are associated with lower premiums.  Higher premiums are paid for smaller firms 
(DV is significantly negative in three of the models), and higher premiums are paid for 
firms  that  perform  poorly  before  the  takeover  (ARET is  significantly  negative  in  all 
cases).  The other significant target-specific control is the debt-to-assets ratio, and this is 
positive – targets with higher debt levels attract greater premiums.  This finding is at 
variance  with  those  of  Bargeron  et  al (2007),  who  found  that  leverage  was  not  a 
significant determinant of premiums.  Neither EBM nor MTB – our proxies for free cash 
flow and the q-ratio – are significant.
There  is  an  argument  that  the  method  of  payment  should  not  be  controlled  for  in 
examining the issue of private equity premiums.  Private equity firms may well argue that 
they do not have the ability to offer stock as consideration in takeover bids, and further, 
non-cash payments can be converted to cash by target shareholders at their discretion.  If 
we agree with this argument, the appropriate comparator in a study of premiums would 
be all premiums paid by public acquirers, rather than just cash premiums.  We therefore 
re-run  the  regressions  reported  in  Table  6  without  the  dummy  variable  STOCK;  the 
results  are  reported  in  Table  7.    As  can  be  seen  in  the  table,  the  indicator  variable 
PEDUM becomes highly insignificant for the AR measures of premium.  However, the 
coefficients  on  PEDUM  for  the  simple  premium  measures  (PREM1  and  PREM10) 
decrease  (in  an  absolute  sense)  less  dramatically, and  the  p-values  show  that  their 
significance decreases only slightly (from p = 0.06 to 0.12 for PREM1 and 0.10 to 0.11 
for PREM10).   This  finding underlines the problems  associated with  using abnormal 
returns around the announcement day as a proxy for premium.  Rather than picking up a 
fundamental  difference  between  cash  and  non-cash  premiums,  the  dummy  variable 
STOCK is more likely to be proxying for a lower likelihood of success for non-cash bids 
than  for  cash.    This  is  confirmed  by  the  insignificance  of  STOCK  for  PREM1  and 
PREM10 in our full multivariate results reported in Table 6.
As  discussed  in  the  introduction,  Bargeron  et  al (2007)  found  that  the  difference  in 
premiums between private and public firms could be explained by agency issues, and that 19
rather than private equity firms paying target shareholders too little, public firms pay too 
much.  They found that acquiring firms with low levels of managerial shareholding paid 
higher premiums, and that firms with strong managerial shareholdings paid essentially 
the same premiums as private equity firms.  We gathered data from the Edgar database 
on officers’ and directors’ shareholdings (as a proportion of shares outstanding).  The 
data were available for only 44 of our 59 public acquirers, and these are plotted against 
the AR1 measure of premium in Figure 4.  (Similar patterns were found using the other 
premium proxies).  As can be seen in the figure, rather than being an inverse relation a lá
Bargeron et al (2007), the relation is in fact positive – premiums are higher for greater 
levels of managerial shareholding.  Although the relation is not particularly strong (the 
correlation is 0.34), this finding is unexpected.  However, most of the acquiring firms for 
which we were able to find managerial stockholding data were non-cash acquirers; only 7 
out of the 44 paid cash premiums, whereas Bargeron et al’s (2007) sample of public firms 
comprised cash acquirers only.
Determinants of private equity and public acquirer premiums
For completeness we re-run our regressions for the private equity and public company 
sub-samples separately; the results are reported in Table 8.  There are several interesting 
findings from this analysis.  First, the explanatory power of the private equity models
(Panel A) is much higher, and the results more consistent across the four models, than the 
findings for the public acquirers (Panel B).  Second, private equity firms  do not pay 
higher premiums for firms with strong cash flow (the cash flow variable, EBM, is not 
significant).    While  the  finding  on  EBM is  consistent  with  Bargeron  et  al’s  (2007) 
insignificant  operating  cash  flow  variable, it  is  inconsistent  with  earlier  findings  on 
takeovers generally (Walkling and Edmister, 1985) that free cash flow is associated with 
higher premiums, and the intuition that private equity buyers would be willing to pay 
more for such firms because the deals could be financed with greater leverage.  Third, 
DV is highly significant – the smaller the private equity target, the larger the premium.  
This (and the fact that this variable is not as strongly significant for public acquirer firms) 
is consistent with a regulatory cost argument – that there are significantly more savings 
involved in taking small firms out of public ownership vis-à-vis larger firms.  Given that 20
many prior studies have not found any relation between firm size and premium (Asquith, 
Bruner and Mullins, 1983; Hayn, 1989), this finding – in our post-Sarbanes Oxley sample 
– contributes to the body of evidence on the costs for small firms of complying with the 
new regulations.  
Fourth, as for the sample firms overall, higher premiums are paid by private equity firms 
in the presence of higher leverage and higher market-to-book (MTB).  Prior studies of 
buyout firms – which have largely examined the propensity to go private rather than 
premium size – found that the typical private equity target had spare debt capacity and 
few opportunities for growth (Opler and Titman, 1993).  Although we are looking at 
premiums rather than likelihood of being taken private, we are very surprised by these 
findings.  The fact that private equity is paying more for ‘growth’ firms and those with
higher financial risk is consistent with the findings of a recent IMF report
7.  It documents 
(among other features) falling interest coverage ratios in recent private equity deals, and 
concludes that:
Gains to private equity holders on LBO targets are increasingly reliant on 
earnings growth, as valuation multiples and leverage rise, and as leveraged 
loan rates have increased.  It appears that private equity has picked most of 
the  ‘low-hanging  fruit’, potentially  straining the  viability of targets in the 
period ahead” (p. 17).
5. Summary and conclusions
In this paper we have attempted to address the question, do private equity acquirers pay 
smaller premiums in their acquisitions than listed firms?  The background for this study is 
the recent allegation that private equity specialists have behaved in an anti-competitive 
manner, and these complaints have attracted the attention of the Department of Justice.  
We have compared takeover premiums for a sample of 55 private equity takeovers with 
59  public  company takeovers announced  during  the 3-year  period  July 2004 to  June 
2007.  After controlling for several other potential determinants of the size of takeover 
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premiums,  we  find  that  private  equity  premiums  are  lower  than  premiums  paid  by 
publicly listed acquirers, although this difference is only weakly significant.  
However, when we remove the dummy variable that controls for method of payment, 
private equity premiums – as proxied by abnormal returns around the announcement date
– are no longer significantly lower than premiums paid by public firms.  Consistent with 
prior  literature,  we  find  that  non-cash  abnormal  returns  earned  by  target  shareholder 
around announcement are lower than cash takeover bid abnormal returns.  But this is not
the case with the ‘simple premium’ – that is, the bid price less the target stock price 
before  the  announcement  (expressed  as  a  percentage of  the  pre-bid  price).    This  is 
because the announcement day abnormal return reflects the likelihood of success of the 
takeover bid  as  well  as  the  premium,  and the market’s  estimate  of  the  likelihood  of 
success appears to be lower for non-cash bids.  Abnormal return is therefore a biased 
estimate of premium.  We find more credible and consistent evidence that premiums are 
lower in private equity takeovers using the ‘simple premium’, although this difference is 
not significant at standard levels in our multivariate analysis.
While we acknowledge that we may be missing some critical control variables, the main 
weakness of our study is the relatively small sample size.  Our marginal findings on 
premium difference point to the potential for a more definitive conclusion using a larger
data set.  Our apparently anomalous finding of a positive relation between premium and 
acquirer officers’ and managers’ shareholding also merits further investigation.22
References
Amit, R. J. Livnat and P. Zarowin (1989) “The mode of corporate diversification: internal 
ventures versus acquisitions” Managerial and Decision Economics 10, 89-100.
Asquith,  P.  (1983)  “Merger  bids,  uncertainty,  and  stockholder  returns”  Journal  of 
Financial Economics 11, 51-84.
Asquith, P., R. F. Bruner, and D. W. Mullins (1983) “The gains to bidding firms from 
merger” Journal of Financial Economics 11, 121-139.
Asquith,  P. and T. Wizman (1990) “Event risk, covenants and bondholder returns in 
leveraged buyouts” Journal of Financial Economics 27, 195-213.
Bargeron, L., F. Schlingemann, R. Stulz and C. Zutter (2007) “Why do private acquirers 
pay so little compared to public acquirers? ECGI Finance Working paper #171/2007.
Bradley, M. (1980) “Interfirm tender offers and the market for corporate control” Journal 
of Business 53(4), 345-376.
Bradley, M., A. Desai, and E. H. Kim (1983) “The rationale behind interfirm tender 
offers: information or synergy” Journal of Financial Economics 11, 183-206.
Brous, P.A., and O. Kini (1993) “A re-examination of analysts’ earnings forecasts for 
takeover targets” Journal of Financial Economics 33, 201-225.
Datta, S., M. Iskander-Datta and K. Raman (2003) “Value creation in corporate asset 
sales: the role of managerial, performance and lender monitoring” Journal of Banking 
and Finance 27(2), 351-375. 
DeAngelo, H. D., DeAngelo and E.M. Rice (1984) “Going private: minority freezeouts and 
stockholder wealth” Journal of Law and Economics 27, 367-401.
Dodd,  P.  and  R.  Ruback  (1977)  “Tender  offers  and  stockholder  retuns:  an  empirical 
analysis” Journal of Financial Economics 5(3), 351-373.
Eckbo, B.E. (1983) “Horizontal mergers, collusion, and stockholder wealth” Journal of 
Financial Economics 11, 241-273.
Ellert, J. C. (1976) “Mergers, Antitrust law enforcement and stockholder returns” The 
Journal of Finance 31(2), 715-732
Fabozzi, F.J., M.G. Ferri, T.D. Fabozzi, and J. Tucker (1988) “A note on unsuccessful 
tender offers and stockholder returns” Journal of Finance 43(5), 1275-1284.23
Frankfurter, G.M. and E. Gunay (1992) “Management buyouts: the sources and sharing 
of wealth between insiders and outside shareholders” Quarterly Review of Economics 
and Finance 32, 82-95.
Gillian, S. and L. Starks (2007) “The evolution of shareholder activism in the United 
States” Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=956670
Goh, J., Gombola, M., Liu, F.Y. and Chou, D.W. (2002) “Going-private restructuring and 
earnings expectations: a test of the release of favorable information for target firms and 
industry rivals” Working paper.
Gompers, P. and J. Lerner (2000) “Money chasing deals? The impact of fund inflows on 
private equity valuations” Journal of Financial Economics 55, 281-325.
Halpern, P., R. Kieschnick, and W. Rotenburg (1999) “On the heterogeneity of leveraged 
going private transactions” Review of Financial Studies 12, 281-309.
Hayn,  C.  (1989)  “Tax  attributes  as  determinants  of  shareholder  gains  in  corporate 
acquisitions” Journal of Financial Economics 23(1), 121-153
Holmstrom, B. and S.N. Kaplan (2001) “Corporate governance and merger activity in the 
US: making sense of the ‘80s and ‘90s” Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 121-144.
Hope,  O.  and  W.  Thomas  (2007)  “Managerial  empire  building  and  firm  disclosure” 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=997864
Huang,  Y.  and  R.A.  Walkling  (1987)  “Target  abnormal  returns  associated  with 
acquisitions  announcements: payment,  acquisition  form  and  managerial  resistance” 
Journal of Financial Economics 19, 329-350.
Huck, S., Konrad, K. A.; Müller, W (2001) “Profitable horizontal mergers without cost 
advantages: the role of internal organization, information, and market structure.” CESifo 
Working Paper No. 435, March 2001.
Hutson, E., 2000. “Takeover targets and the probability of bid success: evidence from the 
Australian market” International Review of Financial Analysis 9(1), 45-65.
Jarrell, G. (1985)  “The wealth effects of litigation by targets: do interests diverge in a 
merge?” Journal of Law and Economics 28, 151-177.
Jennings, R.H. and M.A. Mazzeo (1993) “competing bids, target management and the 
structure of takeover bids” The Review of Financial Studies, 6(4), 883-909
Jensen,  M.  (1986)  “Agency  costs  of  free  cash  flow,  corporate  finance,  and  takeovers” 
American Economic Review, 323-329.24
Jensen,  M.  and  R.S.  Ruback  (1983)  “The  market  for  corporate  control:    the  scientific 
evidence” Journal of Financial Economics 11, 5-50.
Kaplan, S. (1989) “The effects of management buyouts on operations and value” Journal 
of Financial Economics 24, 217-254.
Kaplan, S. and J. Stein (1993) “The evolution of buyout pricing and financial structure in 
the 1980s” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(2), 313-357.
Kaufman, D.J. (1988) “Factors affecting the magnitude of premiums paid to target firm 
shareholders in corporate acquisitions” The Financial Review 23(4), 465-481.
Kieschnick,  R.L.(1998)  “Free  cash  flow  and  stockholder  gains  in  going  private 
transactions revisited” Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 25 (1&2), 187–202.
Lang, L.H.P., R. Stulz, and R. A. Walkling (1989) “Managerial performance, Tobin’s Q 
and the gains from successful tender offers” Journal of Financial Economics 24, 137-
154.
Langetieg, T. (1978) “An application of a three-factor performance index to measure 
stockholders gains from mergers” Journal of Financial Economics 6, 365-384.
Lehn, K. and A. Poulsen (1989) “Free cash flow and stockholder gains in going private 
transactions” Journal of Finance 44(3), 771-788.
Ljungqvist, A. and M. Richardson (2003) “The cash flow, return and risk characteristics 
of private equity” working paper, Stern School of Business.
Lowenstein, L. (1985) “Management buyouts” Columbia Law Review 85, 730-784.
Mandelker, G. (1974) “Risk and return: the case of merging firm” Journal of Financial 
Economics 1, 303-35.
Manne, H. G. (1965) “Mergers and the market for corporate control” The Journal of 
Political Economy 73(2), 110-120
Marais, L., K. Schipper, and A. Smith (1989) “Wealth effects of going private for senior 
securities” Journal of Financial Economics 23(1), 155-191.
Marris, R. (1963) “A model of ‘managerial’ enterprise” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
77, 185-209.
Martin, K. J., and J. J. McConnell (1991) “Corporate performance, corporate takeovers, 
and management turnover” Journal of Finance 46, 671-688.25
Maug, E. (1998) “Large shareholders as monitors: is there a tradeoff between liquidity 
and control?” Journal of Finance 53, 65-98.
Mikkelson,  W.  H.,  and  M.  Partch  (1997)  “The  decline  of  takeovers  and  disciplinary 
managerial turnover” Journal of Financial Economics 44(2), 205-228.
Morck, R., A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny )1990) “Do managerial objectives drive bad 
acquisitions?” Journal of Finance 45(1), 31-48. 
Opler, T. and S. Titman (1993) “The determinants of leverage buyout activity: free cash 
flow versus financial distress costs” Journal of Finance 48(5), 1985-1999.
Oxman, J. and Y. Yildirim (2006) “Evidence of competition in the leveraged buyout 
market” working paper.
Phalippou,  L.  and  O.  Gottschalg  (2007)  “The  performance  of  private  equity  funds”, 
working  paper,  University  of  Amsterdam.    (Forthcoming  in  the  Review  of  Financial 
Studies).
Pound, J. (1988) “Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 22, 241-285.
Renneboog,  L.  and  T.  Simons  (2005)  “Public-to-private  transactions:  LBOs,  MBOs, 
MBIs and IBOs” (August 2005). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 94/2005 Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=796047
Samuelson, W. and L. Rosenthal (1986) “Price movements as indicators of tender offer 
success” Journal of Finance 41(2), 481-499.
Schadler,  F.P.  and  K.E.  Karns  (1990)  “The  unethical  exploitation  of  shareholders  in 
management buyout transactions” Journal of Business Ethics 9, 595-602.
Schwert, G.W. (1996) “Markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions” Journal of Financial 
Economics 41, 153-192.
Servaes, H. (1991) “Tobin's q and the gains from takeovers” Journal of Finance 46(1), 
409-419.
Smiley,  R.  (1976)  “Tender  offers,  transactions  costs  and  the  theory  of  the  firm”
The Review of Economics and Statistics 58(1), 22-32
Smith,  A.  (1990)  “Corporate  ownership  structure  and  performance:  the  case  of 
management buyouts” Journal of Financial Economics 27, 704-739.
Stillman, R. (1983) “Examining antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 11, 225-240.26
Suk, D.Y., and H.M. Sung (1997) “The effects of the method of payment and the type of 
offer on target returns in mergers and tender offers” The Financial Review 32(3), 591-
607. 
Walkling,  R.A.,  and  R.O.  Edmister  (1985)  “Determinants  of  tender  offer  premiums” 
Financial Analysts Journal, 27-36. 
Walkling, R.A. and M.S. Long (1986) “Strategic issues in cash tender offers: predicting bid 
premiums, probability of success, and target management's response” Midland Corporate 
Finance Journal 4, 57-65.
Wansley, J.W., W.R.Lane, and H. C. Yang (1983) “Abnormal returns to acquired firms 
by type of acquisition and method of payment” Financial Management 12(3), 16-22
Warga, A. and I. Welch (1993) “Bondholder losses in leveraged buyouts” The Review of 
Financial Studies 6, 959-982.
Yochberg, Y., A. Ljungqvist and Y. Lu (2007), “Networking as a barrier to entry and the 
competitive supply of venture capital” working paper, Kellogg School of Management.27
Table 1 Summary statistics – control variables
Pre-bid 
performance (%) Financial data
ARET RUNUP DV EBM MTB DA
Panel A: Full sample
mean -1.84 5.02 2235.00 0.14 1.54 0.22
median -3.99 5.96 1115.00 0.11 1.20 0.21
min -101.14 -64.86 11.00 0.00 0.06 0.00
max 102.06 36.17 17704.00 1.21 6.55 0.79
skewness -0.10 -1.02 2.47 4.14 1.79 0.84
kurtosis 1.55 4.34 9.60 25.07 6.24 3.34
Panel B: By acquirer
Public company acquirers
mean -8.26 6.20 2279.00 0.12 1.68 0.20
median -9.25 6.58 1362.00 0.09 1.37 0.18
min -101.14 -26.27 27.00 0.00 0.06 0.00
max 57.71 34.28 12634.00 0.56 5.61 0.74
skewness -0.35 -0.13 1.94 1.93 1.41 0.92
kurtosis 0.51 0.38 6.37 8.40 4.48 3.53
Private equity acquirers
mean 5.05 3.75 2189.00 0.16 1.39 0.24
median -0.02 5.93 947.00 0.11 1.07 0.23
min -47.39 -64.86 11.00 0.01 0.07 0.00
max 102.06 36.17 17704.00 1.21 6.55 0.79
skewness 1.07 -1.31 2.76 3.72 2.30 0.76
kurtosis 2.61 4.94 10.82 17.97 9.00 3.20
t-test p-value 0.02 0.36 0.88 0.11 0.22 0.27
Wilcoxon p-value 0.04 0.55 0.44 0.10 0.13 0.25
Notes. The dummy control variables are STOCK (1 for non-cash bids and 0 for cash bids); TO
(1 if the acquisition was conducted via a tender offer); THLD (1 if the acquiring firm had a 
toehold in the target); and DIVERS (1 if the acquired firm is in a different industry (2-digit 
SIC) from the acquirer).  DA is the book debt-to-assets ratio, DV is the market capitalisation of 
the  target  firm  on  the  day  of  announcement (in  millions  of  dollars),  MTB is  the  market 
capitalisation on the day of the takeover announcement to book value of assets, and EMB is 
EBITDA/market capitalisation.  RUNUP is the market-adjusted target return for day –63 to 
day –6 relative to announcement day (day 0), and ARET is the same for day –250 to day –63.  
The row marked ‘Wilcoxon p-value’ is the p-value for a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum test for 
the difference between the private equity acquirer variable and the public company acquirer 
variable.28
Table 2 Summary statistics – premiums
Measures of premium (%)
AR1 AR10 PREM1 PREM10
Panel A: Full sample
mean 16.83 17.33 24.45 25.40
median 15.65 14.81 20.88 21.96
min -7.13 -16.15 -8.59 -8.94
max 65.51 52.38 96.81 98.72
skewness 0.77 0.41 1.19 1.32
kurtosis 3.72 2.93 4.94 5.38
Panel B: By type
Public company acquirers
mean 18.13 18.32 27.69 28.55
median 15.91 17.00 23.51 24.19
min -5.94 -16.15 -8.59 -8.94
max 65.51 52.38 96.81 98.72
skewness 1.08 0.32 1.32 1.25
kurtosis 4.44 2.72 5.24 4.78
Private equity acquirers
mean 15.45 16.27 20.98 22.02
median 15.53 14.67 17.65 18.99
min -7.13 -2.89 -3.21 -2.06
max 44.48 43.26 66.67 65.29
skewness 0.42 0.41 0.84 0.92
kurtosis 2.57 2.76 3.23 3.73
t-test p-value 0.28 0.40 0.05 0.05
Wilcoxon p-value 0.31 0.55 0.05 0.09
Notes. PREM1 and PREM10 are ‘simple premiums’ calculated by 
subtracting the stock price one and 10 days prior to announcement 
from the takeover bid price, and AR1 and AR10 are market adjusted 
abnormal returns from 1 and 10 days before the announcement until 
and including announcement day.  The row marked ‘Wilcoxon p-
value’ is the p-value for a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum test for the 
difference  between  the  private  equity  acquirer  variable  and  the 
public company acquirer variable.29
Table 3 Public acquirer sample characteristics
Measures of premium (%) Control variables
AR1 AR10 PREM1 PREM10 DV EBM MTB DA
Cash bids (n = 18)
average 25.51 25.23 32.92 32.15 1842 0.10 1.99 0.11
median 23.55 24.11 29.86 27.43 844 0.08 1.59 0.07
min 3.51 -6.05 7.77 -0.86 33 0.01 0.47 0.00
max 65.51 52.38 96.81 79.61 12634 0.28 4.97 0.39
Non-cash bids (n = 41)
average 14.88 15.29 25.39 26.97 2470 0.13 1.54 0.24
median 11.56 11.29 20.62 23.15 1590 0.09 1.14 0.23
min -5.94 -16.15 -8.59 -8.94 27 0.00 0.06 0.00
max 43.54 47.29 89.26 98.72 10901 0.56 5.61 0.74
t-test p-value 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.38 0.44 0.38 0.20 0.01
Wilcoxon p-value 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.13 0.30 0.50 0.15 0.03
Notes. The dummy variables are STOCK (1 for non-cash bids and 0 for cash bids); TO (1 if the acquisition was 
conducted via a tender offer); THLD (1 if the acquiring firm had a toehold in the target); and DIVERS (1 if the 
acquired firm is in a different industry (2-digit SIC) from the acquirer).  DA is the book debt-to-assets ratio, DV
is the market capitalisation of the target firm on the day of announcement (in millions of dollars), MTB is the 
market  capitalisation  on  the  day  of  the  takeover  announcement  to  book  value  of  assets,  and  EMB  is 
EBITDA/market capitalisation. PREM1 and PREM10  are ‘simple premiums’ calculated by subtracting the stock 
price 1 and 10 days prior to announcement from the takeover bid price, and AR1 and AR10 are market adjusted 
abnormal returns from 1 and 10 days before the announcement until and including announcement day.  The row 
marked ‘Wilcoxon p-value’ is the p-value for a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum test for the difference between the 
private equity acquirer variable and the public company acquirer variable.30





Consumer  2 10
Energy and Power  12 1
Healthcare  13 6
High Technology  15 10
Industrials  3 0
Materials  7 9
Media and Entertainment  3 5
Real Estate  0 1
Retail  2 13
Telecommunications  2 0
Total 59 5531
Table 5 Correlations
DA DV MTB EBM ARET RUNUP AR1 AR10 PREM1 PREM10
DA 0 0.18 0.17 0.47 0.21 -0.09 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.17
(1.91) (1.83) (5.68) (2.24) (0.98) (1.82) (1.77) (1.32) (1.87)
DV 0 0.25 0.02 0.15 0.02 -0.35 -0.21 -0.40 -0.26
(2.73) (0.22) (1.64) (0.17) (4.01) (2.25) (4.68) (2.85)
MTB 0 -0.31 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.11
(3.41) (1.55) (1.02) (1.14) (1.46) (0.84) (1.15)
EBM 0 0.01 -0.13 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02
(0.06) (1.40) (0.12) (0.18) (0.25) (0.25)
ARET 0 -0.08 -0.20 -0.19 -0.21 -0.22
(0.80) (2.20) (2.09) (2.32) (2.42)
RUNUP 0 -0.10 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07
(1.10) (0.74) (0.93) (0.74)
Notes.  In this table we present the Pearson correlation coefficients for the main control variables and 
for the measures of premium.  In brackets underneath each coefficient is the t-statistic (a bold t-statistic 
denotes significance at the 5 percent level or better).  DA is the book debt-to-assets ratio, DV is the 
market capitalisation of the target firm on the day of announcement, MTB is the market capitalisation on 
the  day  of  the  takeover  announcement  to  book  value  of  assets,  and  EMB  is  EBITDA/market 
capitalisation. PREM1 and PREM10  are ‘simple premiums’ calculated by subtracting the stock price 1 
and 10 days prior to announcement from the takeover bid price, and AR1 and AR10 are market adjusted 
abnormal returns from 1 and 10 days before the announcement until and including announcement day.  32
Table 6 Regression results
Abnormal Return Premium
AR1 AR10 PREM1 PREM10
Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
Constant 0.443 0.00 0.329 0.02 0.575 0.00 0.442 0.01
PEDUM -0.115 0.03 -0.102 0.08 -0.135 0.06 -0.125 0.10
STOCK -0.114 0.02 -0.113 0.05 -0.074 0.23 -0.071 0.31
THLD -0.064 0.11 -0.028 0.40 -0.071 0.20 -0.044 0.41
TO -0.006 0.88 -0.004 0.92 -0.018 0.79 -0.033 0.61
DIVERS -0.006 0.93 -0.028 0.56 -0.015 0.87 -0.031 0.72
DA 0.183 0.00 0.161 0.04 0.194 0.01 0.214 0.02
logDV -0.030 0.01 -0.017 0.19 -0.041 0.00 -0.026 0.09
logMTB 0.015 0.33 0.001 0.97 0.030 0.15 0.010 0.62
logEBM 0.001 0.93 -0.009 0.57 0.005 0.84 -0.005 0.83
ARET -0.092 0.03 -0.078 0.07 -0.141 0.02 -0.161 0.01
RUNUP -0.131 0.15 -0.246 0.08
Adj. R-sq 0.23 0.09 0.25 0.15
Notes. PREM1 and PREM10  are ‘simple premiums’ calculated by subtracting the stock price 1 and 10 days 
prior to announcement from the takeover bid price, and AR1 and AR10 are market adjusted abnormal returns 
from 1 and 10 days before the announcement until and including announcement day.  PEDUM is the indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer is a private equity firm.  The dummy control variables are 
STOCK (1 for non-cash bids and 0 for cash bids); TO (1 if the acquisition was conducted via a tender offer); 
THLD (1 if the acquiring firm had a toehold in the target); and DIVERS (1 if the acquired firm is in a different 
industry (2-digit SIC) from the acquirer).  DA is the book debt-to-assets ratio, DV is the market capitalisation 
of the target firm on the day of announcement, MTB is the market capitalisation on the day of the takeover 
announcement to book value of assets, and EMB is EBITDA/market capitalisation.  RUNUP is the market-
adjusted target return for day –63 to day –6 relative to announcement day (day 0), and ARET is the same for 
day –250 to day –63.  The row marked ‘Wilcoxon p-value’ is the p-value for a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum 
test for the difference between the private equity acquirer variable and the public company acquirer variable.33
Table 7 Regression results, without controlling for consideration
Abnormal Return Premium
AR1 AR10 PREM1 PREM10
Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
Constant 0.340 0.00 0.223 0.02 0.591 0.00 0.448 0.00
PEDUM -0.014 0.57 -0.002 0.94 -0.066 0.12 -0.058 0.11
THLD -0.064 0.26 -0.027 0.61 -0.080 0.20 -0.052 0.42
TO 0.071 0.07 0.072 0.06 0.035 0.58 0.018 0.77
DIVERS -0.001 0.99 -0.023 0.64 -0.010 0.92 -0.026 0.76
DA 0.159 0.01 0.137 0.06 0.180 0.02 0.200 0.02
logDV -0.028 0.00 -0.014 0.13 -0.049 0.00 -0.032 0.00
logMTB 0.018 0.23 0.004 0.82 0.029 0.14 0.010 0.63
logEBM 0.007 0.64 -0.003 0.83 0.008 0.72 -0.002 0.94
ARET -0.100 0.02 -0.085 0.05 -0.149 0.02 -0.168 0.01
RUNUP -0.137 0.14 -0.244 0.08
Adj. R-sq 0.20 0.06 0.25 0.15
Notes. In  this table  we  repeat  the  regressions  reported  in  Table  6  without  the  control  variable  STOCK.  
PREM1 and PREM10  are ‘simple premiums’ calculated by subtracting the stock price 1 and 10 days prior to 
announcement from the takeover bid price, and AR1 and AR10 are market adjusted abnormal returns from 1 
and  10  days  before  the  announcement  until  and  including  announcement  day.    PEDUM is  the  indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer is a private equity firm.  The dummy control variables are TO
(1 if the acquisition was conducted via a tender offer); THLD (1 if the acquiring firm had a toehold in the 
target); and DIVERS (1 if the acquired firm is in a different industry (2-digit SIC) from the acquirer).  DA is 
the book debt-to-assets ratio, DV is the market capitalisation of the target firm on the day of announcement, 
MTB is the market capitalisation on the day of the takeover announcement to book value of assets, and EMB is 
EBITDA/market capitalisation.  RUNUP is the market-adjusted target return for day –63 to day –6 relative to 
announcement day (day 0), and ARET is the same for day –250 to day –63.  The row marked ‘Wilcoxon p-
value’ is the p-value for a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum test for the difference between the private equity 
acquirer variable and the public company acquirer variable.34
Table 8 Regression results: private equity and public company separately
Abnormal Return Premium
AR1 AR10 PREM1 PREM10
Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
Panel A: Private equity
Constant 0.449 0.00 0.357 0.00 0.655 0.00 0.543 0.00
DA 0.201 0.00 0.150 0.05 0.234 0.00 0.200 0.04
logDV -0.041 0.00 -0.025 0.02 -0.060 0.00 -0.040 0.00
logMTB 0.044 0.01 0.029 0.13 0.072 0.01 0.057 0.03
logEBM 0.029 0.22 0.028 0.15 0.043 0.22 0.049 0.13
ARET -0.109 0.08 -0.058 0.23 -0.114 0.14 -0.085 0.11
RUNUP -0.229 0.05 -0.228 0.19
Adj R-sq 0.39 0.16 0.39 0.23
Panel B: Public companies
C 0.273 0.01 0.168 0.18 0.519 0.00 0.356 0.02
STOCK -0.111 0.02 -0.114 0.04 -0.081 0.20 -0.083 0.24
THLD -0.064 0.04 -0.027 0.40 -0.085 0.13 -0.057 0.33
TO -0.004 0.91 -0.001 0.98 -0.018 0.80 -0.032 0.64
DIVERS 0.016 0.78 -0.040 0.35 -0.019 0.83 -0.066 0.39
DA 0.065 0.54 0.131 0.33 0.086 0.58 0.185 0.24
logDV -0.013 0.18 -0.003 0.77 -0.039 0.01 -0.024 0.08
logMTB -0.030 0.19 -0.028 0.20 -0.032 0.41 -0.049 0.17
logEBM -0.024 0.16 -0.040 0.03 -0.033 0.25 -0.055 0.08
ARET -0.078 0.10 -0.094 0.11 -0.139 0.10 -0.203 0.02
RUNUP 0.127 0.23 -0.117 0.65
Adj R-sq 0.18 0.07 0.13 0.11
Notes. PREM1 and PREM10  are ‘simple premiums’ calculated by subtracting the stock price 1 and 10 days 
prior to announcement from the takeover bid price, and AR1 and AR10 are market adjusted abnormal returns 
from 1 and 10 days before the announcement until and including announcement day.  PEDUM is the indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer is a private equity firm.  The dummy control variables are 
STOCK (1 for non-cash bids and 0 for cash bids); TO (1 if the acquisition was conducted via a tender offer); 
THLD (1 if the acquiring firm had a toehold in the target); and DIVERS (1 if the acquired firm is in a different 
industry (2-digit SIC) from the acquirer).  DA is the book debt-to-assets ratio, DV is the market capitalisation 
of the target firm on the day of announcement, MTB is the market capitalisation on the day of the takeover 
announcement to book value of assets, and EMB is EBITDA/market capitalisation.  RUNUP is the market-
adjusted target return for day –63 to day –6 relative to announcement day (day 0), and ARET is the same for 
day –250 to day –63.  The row marked ‘Wilcoxon p-value’ is the p-value for a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum 
test for the difference between the private equity acquirer variable and the public company acquirer variable.35
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